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We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely
mapped onto specific brain ‘‘networks’’ and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary,
including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic
(i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and
extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We
contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual–
perceptual, (b) cross-modal (synesthetic), (c) movement–movement, and (d) perceptual-
affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate outside of
conscious awareness. That is, they are informationally encapsulated (Fodor, 1983), ‘‘pre-
wired’’ (Marcus, 2004), and probably universal across human populations (Brown, 1991,
1999, 2000). In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (BmT), the standard theory (SmT)
maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target
domain (e.g., Gentner, Holyoak & Kokinov, 2001; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and/or
represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions (e.g., Glucksberg, 2003).
For instance, Gentner and colleagues (Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997)
argue that similarity, including metaphoric similarity as well as analogy, involves a process
of ‘‘structure alignment’’—a one-to-one correspondence between mapped elements and
‘‘systematicity’’—a matching of connected systems of relations. Metaphors, however, map
both systems of relations (e.g., atomic structure is like a solar system) and attributes of
objects (e.g., ‘‘His hand was like a vise’’) depending on the type of the metaphor. This
differentiation of similarity, however, conflates analogy with metaphor and BmT theory
suggests that metaphor is a separate species, at least for the metaphorical relations
subsumed by it. On the other hand, Glucksberg and colleagues (Glucksberg, 2003;
Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993) contend that metaphors are more properly thought of as
‘‘implicit class-inclusion relations.’’ For instance, the metaphorical statement, ‘‘Cigarettes
are time bombs,’’ is a class-inclusion assertion in which the terms, ‘‘cigarettes’’ and ‘‘time
bombs’’ are absorbed under the superordinate category, ‘‘time bombs.’’ Nevertheless, what
is left out of both of these accounts is how people actually go about selecting which
relations, which attributes or which terms to attend to in the first place.
While Glucksberg and colleagues maintain that metaphoric statements are apprehended
as ordinary language—‘‘quickly and automatically’’—it would appear that metaphor
comprehension probably occurs in conscious awareness because it involves, among other
things, ongoing decisions about how to respond to mutually constituted social interactions
(e.g., Speaker A: ‘‘Cigarettes are time bombs.’’ Speaker B: ‘‘Yes, I stopped smoking several
years ago’’); although the authors do not confront this thorny aspect of metaphoric
language—that it often serves some conscious social purpose. Indeed, Gentner and
colleagues indicate that analogy and metaphor involve more abstract conceptual relations
and presumably entail some conscious mechanisms.People make analogical and metaphoric inferences based on higher-order connecting
relations (p. 239).Similar accounts are found elsewhere in the literature and are widespread, i.e., metaphor
involves the mapping of conceptual domains at high levels of abstraction and entails some
conscious mechanisms (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
Lakoff (1993), however, suggests that conceptual metaphor is largely unconscious and
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system ‘‘contains thousands of conventional metaphorical mappings’’ (p. 245). We criticize
this view below under ‘‘Alternative Theories of Early Metaphor.’’ In any event, the
nonconscious mechanisms operating outside awareness are notoriously difficult to pin
down (Allen & Reber, 1998).
To be sure, consciousness deals with situations that require novel and nonstereotypical
responses. Nonconscious mechanisms, however, function to deal with stereotypical forms
of behavior conditioned by evolution for immediate and efficient use (Koch, 2004; Searle,
2005). We propose that the kinds of basic metaphoric relations in BmT are largely
nonconscious and automatic: Notwithstanding individual differences, we might easily
perceive a plate of spaghetti as a collection of worms or a stop sign as a popsicle
(perceptual–perceptual metaphors), a spinning top as a ballerina (movement–movement
metaphor), a front of a car as smiling (perceptual-affective metaphor) or music as sad
(cross-modal metaphor; see Seitz, 2001a, 2005). That is, they involve extensive
automaticity including implicit perception, memory, and thought; they are fast and
independent (Marcus, 2004); they are engaged by specific environmental stimuli; and they
are largely innate (Kihlstrom, 1987, 2002; see below). Cytowic (2002a, b) makes a related
case for synesthesia arguing that that it is automatic, involuntary, and inborn.
SmT thus captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not
primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We think our theory BmT explains more
about how people actually create or recognize metaphoric associations across disparate
domains of experience partly because they are ‘‘pre-wired’’ to make these links. That is, we
propose that humans have specialized neural subsystems for metaphoric understanding
and production that are fine-tuned by experience and continuously modulated by
underlying genetic mechanisms (Marcus, 2004).
The fundamental ability to link disparate sensory, perceptual, enactive, and affective
domains can be described as an inter-, poly-, or multisensory ability or supra-, trans-,
hetero- or multimodular capacity (Calvert, 2001, Seitz, 1997). That is, these basic
metaphoric relations (BmT) rely on central sensory, perceptual, and affective mechanisms
that relate percepts and affects across dissimilar psychological domains based on relations
within and between brain areas or ‘‘networks’’ (see below). For instance, biological
constraints in the maturation of the intersensory areas in the mid- and frontal areas of the
brain underlie synesthetic metaphor or the ability to link disparate sensory modalities
(Marks, 1996; Marks & Bornstein, 1987; Marks, Hammeal, & Bornstein, 1987;
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a, b).
Similarly, we have shown that the ability to link the physical and psychological domains
(‘‘psychological–physical metaphor;’’ Cicone, Gardner, & Winner, 1981) is based on the
earlier ability to attribute affective properties to inanimate objects or what we have called
‘‘physiognomic metaphor’’ (Seitz, 1998b; Seitz & Beilin, 1987). For instance, whereas
synesthetic metaphor is largely biological constrained, appears to derive from an inborn
sense of similarity or comparison, and relies less on learning and development—that is to
say, is largely intuitive (see below)—psychological–physical metaphor violates category
boundaries based on learned conceptual relations (whether from informal experience or
formal learning) and the probable rejection (whether conscious or not) of cultural and
linguistic conventions. This is, at least, true of novel metaphors if not conventional ones
(Gentner et al., 2001) as Quinn (1991) has argued: Metaphors are typically chosen by
speakers because they are already part of existing cultural understandings.
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biological capacity to impute affective properties to inanimate and animate objects (Seitz
& Beilin, 1987). Autistic children who lack this capacity are unable to attribute affective
properties to social or nonsocial objects or use or apprehend metaphoric language (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Seitz, 1996)—notwithstanding Kanner’s
(1946) earlier but incorrect use of the term ‘‘metaphoric language’’ in autistic children (see
Seitz, 1996)—as are brain damaged adults with alexithymia (Brothers, 1989) and adults
with forms of prosopagnosia in which there is damage to anterior regions of area V4 in the
inferior temporal lobe that underlie both affective recognition and expression in the face
(Zeki, 1999).
2. Intuition and metaphor
2.1. The role of intuition in the basic and standard theory
BmT posits that these four fundamental metaphors (i.e., perceptual–perceptual, cross-
modal, movement–movement, and perceptual-affective relations) operate outside of
awareness and manifest extensive automaticity in the initial stages of processing
(Kihlstrom, 2002). That is, they are engaged by specific environmental stimuli (e.g.,
shape, size, texture, pitch, rhythm, rate, intensity, and spatial location) and the stimulus
may not be consciously registered in its initial encounter. For instance, young children
experience the fronts of cars as having affective expressions (Seitz & Beilin, 1987) or
experience sounds as being associated with colors or textures (Seitz, 1998a, b) without
being consciously aware that they are doing so. This experience or ‘‘feeling of knowing’’ is
very similar to the phenomenon of intuition and with the cognate view that creative
thought occurs in four stages: Incubation, insight, confirmation, and verification (Wallas,
1926). Intuition has been defined as reaching conclusions based on nonconscious processes
of reasoning (Gregory, 1998). Metaphoric intuition would operate both during the
‘‘incubation’’ stage in which unconscious ideas begin to coalesce and during the ‘‘insight’’
stage in which new ideas begin to emerge into consciousness. This is not to say that much
of our everyday perceptual and cognitive apparatus (e.g., parsing sentences, accommodat-
ing the eyes to an object in the distance) does not occur outside of awareness; this is a
truism.
Bowers and colleagues (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990) have investigated
the way intuition works during each of these two stages. In what they call the initial
guiding stage, there is an unconscious and implicit perception of coherence that activates
pertinent semantic networks in a graded and cumulative manner. ‘‘Hunches’’ and
‘‘hypotheses’’ emerge from underlying unconscious cognitive processes, i.e., in the course
of a ‘‘preanalytic’’ or ‘‘automatic’’ stage of inquiry. Basic metaphorical processes of the
kind described in BmT, in both children and adults, would be operative during this guiding
or ‘‘incubation’’ stage of unconscious perception. Priming, an example of perceptual
learning, has many features of this initial guiding stage of intuition. Squire and Kandel
(1998) have argued that (a) priming is a form of nondeclarative memory, (b) that is has a
brain basis (areas V1 and V2, see below), and (c) occurs in brain areas thought to be
nonconscious (Koch, 2004).
In the second or ‘‘insight’’ stage, more advanced conceptual metaphor and analogical
reasoning abilities would emerge. Bowers et al. (1990) reason that such an ‘‘integrative
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memory search (e.g., by way of spreading activation within a neuronal network) for
corresponding attributes or relations for any two (or more) domains under comparison.
Everyday experience, formal schooling, linguistic conventions, and social and cultural
traditions, moreover, would shape these ongoing cognitive mechanisms (Seitz, 1999b,
2003a, b). Conceptual metaphor and more advanced analogical operations would be
operative during this ‘‘integrative’’ stage of comparison.
In the following section, we look at the developmental emergence of these basic
metaphoric abilities in infants and young children.
3. Developmental evidence
3.1. Perceptual metaphor
It has been amply documented that, early on, very young children (i.e., the beginning of
the third year of life) are able to exploit the perceptual features of shape, color, texture, and
size in making metaphorical associations in renaming single objects or pictures (e.g., Seitz,
1997, 1998a, b; Winner, McCarthy, & Gardner, 1980; Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman, &
Gardner, 1979). For instance, a preschool child may refer to a plate of spaghetti as a
‘‘bunch of worms’’ or a vehicular caution sign as a ‘‘lemon ice cream cone.’’ They can note
these correspondences both in language as well as in match-to-sample tasks and similar
nonverbal formats in which they must chose an analogous object from an array of pictorial
or nonverbal choices (e.g., Kogan, Connor, Gross, & Fava, 1980; Seitz, 1997, 1998b).
3.2. Enactive metaphor
Correspondingly, young children can make use of movement and motion information—
exploit enactive components of metaphor—in both categorizing moving objects and in
making metaphorical associations (Dent, 1984; Seitz, 1999a, 2000a, c, 2002). For example,
a preschool child can note the metaphorical similarity between a spinning top and a
dancing ballerina in a match-to-sample or similar nonverbal (e.g., filmed) format (Dent,
1984). Likewise, infants (18–24 months) can note the enactive similarity between a paper
crayon cover that has slipped off and the putting on of an article of clothing, ‘‘I am putting
your clothes on crayon’’ (Winner et al., 1980).
3.3. Cross-modal (synesthetic) metaphor
In a similar manner, infants and young children can perceive likeness in different sensory
modalities (e.g., Gardner, 1974; Marks et al., 1987; Seitz, 1997, 1998a, b; Spelke, 1981). An
instance of such a synesthetic or cross-modal association would be a 3-month-old infant
that dishabituates to the synchrony between a toy monkey and its complementary sound
(Spelke, 1981), a 3-year old that applies the polar adjectives ‘‘light/dark’’ to an object (e.g.,
sandpaper) felt while blindfolded (Gardner, 1974) or a preschooler who indicates that red
is a warm or hot color (Seitz, 1997). Indeed, the distinguished art historian, Ernest
Gombrich (1963), has long observed that such ‘‘natural metaphors’’—bright sounds or
cool colors—arise spontaneously in perception because they are part of our innate
constitution.
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During the very early preschool years rudimentary physiognomic experiences—the
attribution of affective properties to visually perceived objects as well as other sensory
experiences (e.g., identifying the front grille of an automobile as a ‘‘smiling face’’ or a piece
of music as ‘‘cheerful’’)—gain prominence (Seitz, 1992, 1997, 1998a, b; Seitz & Beilin,
1987). In one large study, child and adult responses to physiognomically suggestive visual
metaphor were examined in photographs (Seitz & Beilin, 1987). Preschoolers, 3 and 4 years
of age, normal and high IQ children, 6 and 8 years of age, and adults were shown 10
photographs of cars, rocks, plants, and other inanimate objects and their responses
categorized by type of metaphor (i.e., physiognomic characteristics, physical similarity and
orientation, and intertextual, gestural–facial, and allegorization responses). Preschool and
6-year-old children demonstrated significant levels of physiognomic responding, although
high IQ, older children, and adults showed even higher levels of physiognomic responding
presumably as a result of more advanced narrative abilities. All groups displayed high
consistency in physiognomic object responses across photographs and were equally good
in categorizing a photograph using orientational metaphors. It therefore appears that
physiognomic metaphor is a robust phenomenon across the lifespan, originating in the
very early childhood years, at least as early as the second half of the third year of life (Seitz,
2001b; Seitz & Beilin, 1987).
3.5. Two distinct developmental phases
Indeed, we have shown in several studies that the developmental emergence of basic
(BmT) and conceptual metaphor (SmT) occurs in two distinct developmental phases that
parallel the emergence of the guiding and integrative stages of intuition. In a test of this
two-stage theory, 240 children 3- to 7-years-of-age were given a series of metaphor
comprehension tasks in both the visual and verbal modality (Seitz, 1997, 1998a; Seitz &
Beilin, 1987). In the initial stage, children 4-years-of-age and younger exhibited a proclivity
to violate category boundaries that were innately constrained (i.e., perceptual, synesthetic,
and physiognomic metaphor). In the later stage, however, older children evidenced an
inclination to violate category boundaries that relied on learning (e.g., formal schooling
and experience) and/or rejection of cultural, social, and linguistic conventions. These
included psychological–physical metaphors (e.g., ‘‘Bill was as cool as a cucumber’’) and
conceptual or abstract metaphors (e.g., ‘‘The bird chirped like a violin’’). As a result, it was
suggested that adult creativity necessarily draws on both early metaphor that is largely
innately constrained (BmT) as well as later developing secondary or conceptual metaphor
(SmT) that relies on informal and formal learning and (in novel metaphor) the rejection of
linguistic, social, and cultural conventions. Conceptual metaphor, moreover, would be
based on something akin to Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of experiential similarity or co-
occurrence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). They suggest that metaphorical concepts are
assembled from either similarity encountered in the environment (e.g., noting the similarity
between life and a gambling game as in ‘‘Where is he when the chips are down?’’) or
correlations between domains as a result of their co-occurrence (e.g., experiencing ‘‘more’’
and ‘‘up’’ together as in ‘‘My income rose last year’’).
Nonetheless, evolutionary evidence indicates that the foregoing ontogeny of metaphor
in the infant and young child has a clear parallel in the evolution of metaphoric abilities in
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evidence is important because it provides a lens on the adaptive advantages such abilities in
humans would serve and for what biological purposes they may have originally evolved
(Sober & Wilson, 1997).
4. Evolutionary theories
4.1. Perceptual and synesthetic metaphor
Merlin Donald (1991) has suggested that in the evolution of primates, metaphoric or
‘‘integrative’’ thought originated in early primate ‘‘episodic culture’’ associated with the
initial appearance of perceptual metaphor including cross-modal associations. For what
reason would these abilities have evolved in early primates? Early primate cognition would
have necessitated the ability to engage in complex event discrimination (‘‘episodic
cognition’’) and to react to complex patterns of stimuli based on earlier experiences
(‘‘episodic memory’’) and such abilities would have been associated with both object and
cross-modal perception. Comparable abilities, of course, are found in human infants (e.g.,
Lewkowicz, 1994, Spelke, 1981; Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981) and
highlight the central role of neoteny in human development. Neoteny is the slowing down
of development in the ontogeny of descendents such that a mental or physical ability in
juveniles of ancestral forms is retained in adults (Gould, 1977). In this case, episodic
cognition in humans is a cognitive legacy (i.e., an archaic cognitive ability) inherited from
earlier primates that proved useful to later evolving human primates in understanding
conspecifics, their interactions, and events they initiated or encountered in the natural and
social environment (i.e., ‘‘episodic culture,’’ Bownds, 1999).
4.2. Enactive metaphor
Subsequently, enactive metaphor emerged in early hominid ‘‘mimetic’’ cultures,
according to Donald (1991). He maintains that early hominid cognition would have
required the ability to model behavior of conspecifics through vocal prosody, eye
movement and gaze, facial expression, manual signs and gestures, rhythm, postural
attitudes, and whole-body movements. These early abilities would have combined primate
event perception with a complex map of the body tied to self-initiated actions. That is,
early hominids would have developed the ability to kinesthetically model perceptual events
in the environment as well as the ability to recall those events, both putatively mediated by
recently discovered ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in the human cortex (see below). These capabilities
would have evolved, according to Donald (1991), to facilitate toolmaking, fire and tool
use, acclimation to seasonal changes in ecology and climate, participation in seasonal
group hunting, and these capabilities would have most likely promoted social bonding
through such actions as primitive pantomimic rituals. Not surprisingly, pretend action
metaphors appear in the speech and gestures of very young children (Winner, 1988).
4.3. Nonverbal metaphor
More advanced metaphoric operations appeared, however, as human ‘‘mythic’’ cultures
evolved approximately 250,000 years ago, precipitating language abilities and integrative
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uses of metaphor as well as simple analogies (see Seitz, 1998b, for a review of the role of
metaphor in gesture as well as the emergence of rudimentary analogy in children). Such
metaphoric thought in early human cultures—primarily iconics (e.g., movements which
depict a bodily action), beats (i.e., movements which accent vocal speech), and metaphoric
gestures (e.g., movements which depict a spatial relation)—would have enabled the
integration of events across individual episodes and facilitated the ability to extract
thematic content paving the way for symbolic languages and discourse, i.e., paradigmatic
(logical) and syntagmatic (narrative) thought. Iconic gestures, moreover, have been
reported to emerge in human infants before 13 months of age (McNeill, 1992) and have
been also reported in modern apes (Tomasello & Call, 1997).
Nonetheless, more complex analogical reasoning including use of visual metaphor and
other rhetorical devices were the outcome of modern human ‘‘theoretic’’ (i.e., symbolic)
cultures that arose during the Upper Paleolithic period, 60,000 or so years ago (see also
MacWhinney, 2002). Under this evolutionary scenario, visual thinking emerged and
extended metaphoric and iconic gesture to the verbal realm in which linguistic and other
symbols were imputed to visual experiences (e.g., ‘‘The road was a rocket of sunlight’’). In
this sense, verbal metaphor (and the conveyance of metaphoric relations through other
symbols) is secondary to action and perception in which metaphoric abilities originate. In
young children, visual metaphor emerges very early in child development (Seitz, 1998b;
Winner, 1988). Donald (1991), thus, provides an evolutionary and biological basis for
emergence of perceptual, enactive, and synesthetic forms of metaphor in primate and
hominid phylogeny.
4.4. Physiognomic metaphor
With regard to physiognomic forms of metaphor, Stephen Mithen (1996) contends that
early metaphoric abilities arose in human evolution during the Middle/Upper Paleolithic
period approximately 40,000 to 60,000 years ago due to increasing ‘‘cognitive fluidity’’ that
allowed language to be metaphorically extended from primarily social to nonsocial uses.
He contends that anthropomorphic (i.e., inanimate objects given human characteristics)
and totemic thought (i.e., the notion that humans are descended from various animals)—
likely precursors of physiognomic metaphor—arose late in human evolution and had
selective advantages including the ability to improve the predictive power and reliability of
securing food and other essential material goods from animal and plant prey.
The emergence of rock art during this same period is instructive. Three types of signs are
found in early rock art: (a) pictograms, i.e., mythograms or representational figures of real
or imaginary objects that consist of zoomorphic (animal-like) or anthropomorphic
(human-like) features; (b) ideograms or synthetic and repetitive signs (e.g., tree-shapes,
phallic and vulvar signs, and groups of lines and dots); and (c) psychograms or sharp
graphic strokes that express human perceptual experiences. Anati (1994) suggests that
these drawn and carved figures have metaphorical significance. For example, a particular
sign may stand in place of individuals or tribal groups (hence, functioning metonymically)
or suggest an interplay between male and female attributes or qualities (hence, functionally
metaphorically). Studies of cave art have come to similar conclusions suggesting that the
origins of Paleolithic art originate in the body and in a complex interplay between human
and animal signs (Vialou, 1996). We suggest that such prehistoric signs have a strong
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Seitz, 2001b, for an explanation of the allure of such percepts in modern projective testing).
Physiognomic metaphor, moreover, emerges very early in human development (Seitz &
Beilin, 1987). Mithen (1996), Anati (1994), and Vialou (1996), therefore, provide an
evolutionary basis for the emergence of physiognomic forms of metaphor in later-evolving
hominid populations. We turn now to the comparative evidence.5. Comparative evidence
Comparative studies across species indicate that the core abilities underlying
metaphor—such as the ability to form mental representations of perceived objects (i.e.,
to categorize and form concepts of objects), integrate sensory and affective experiences of
those objects (i.e., cross-modal transfer), and form relational concepts—may be shared
with other birds and mammals (Hauser, 2000; Pepperberg, 1999; Tomasello & Call, 1997).
For instance, in all investigated primate species there is evidence for cross-modal transfer
between the visual and haptic modalities. Additionally, chimpanzees have demonstrated
the ability to transfer between the visual and gustatory modalities, between the visual and
auditory modalities, as well as across some classes of symbolic stimuli. Bonobos
demonstrate the latter ability. Bushbabies (Prosimians) are able to transfer learned
responses from the visual to the auditory modality. Chimpanzees and other apes and
monkeys (i.e., rhesus macaques, squirrel, and capuchin monkeys) can form relational
categories including the understanding of identity, oddity, and same-difference problems in
match-to-sample like tasks. Chimpanzees are also capable of constructing multiple
groupings of objects in a spontaneous manner and even engage in insight in solving some
kinds of physical problems (Tomasello & Call, 1997). Psittacines (i.e., parrots) demonstrate
Piagetian stage 6 object permanence, form categorical classes of objects, label and
enumerate natural and unnatural objects, fashion concepts of same/different, and display
some comprehension of relative size.1
The foregoing indicates that the core abilities underlying metaphor—the ability to form
mental representations of objects, integrate sensory and affective experiences, and form
relational concepts—are widely distributed in the animal kingdom presumably because
they have evolved to solve similar adaptive problems in the natural world or have emerged
for complex social purposes that have driven the application of these abilities beyond their
immediate Darwinian adaptations. For instance, sentinel behavior or the need to protect
groups of conspecifics from predators, may have been part and parcel of the ability to
categorize objects in the natural world, including conspecifics, and for doing so in a flexible
manner using available information in the environment (Pepperberg, 1999; Seitz, 1999c).
Such a ‘‘universal toolkit’’ or the evolution of domain-general abilities that are common
across species—the ability to recognize objects, enumerate, navigate, and acquire
knowledge (Hauser, 2000)—could form the basis of a species’ ability to relate percepts,
affects, and concepts across disparate domains of experience, i.e., create the conditions for
the evolution of the ability to make metaphoric discriminations. Indeed, the ability to1Physiognomic perception may extend to other species such as canines, at least according to anecdotal
observation. At 14 months my Yorkshire Terrier began barking at two small stone lion statues leading to an
entrance off a New York City sidewalk that he had encountered for the first time in our daily walks.
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capacity of biological systems (Marcus, 2004).
The developmental (i.e., ontogenetic), evolutionary (i.e., phylogenetic), and comparative
evidence, thus, strongly suggest that perceptual, enactive, synesthetic, and physiognomic
metaphoric abilities (BmT) emerge very early in life, are biologically grounded in the ability
to perceive likeness across certain domains, and may further lie at the core of creative
thought. Only secondarily, as we have argued elsewhere (Seitz, 1997, 1998b; the
philosophical basis for this view is presented in Goodman, 1976), is the ability to perceive
likeness or nonliteral similarity ‘‘captured’’ in different symbol systems (e.g., gestures,
words, pictures, numbers, music, dance notation, and so on). We review below the
evidence for the bodily basis of these fundamental metaphoric abilities (BmT).
6. Bodily basis of metaphor
6.1. Motor and nonmotor areas of the brain overlap
The evidence for the bodily or ‘‘embodied’’ basis of early metaphor (BmT) is fourfold. In
the first instance, many of the so-called motor structures in the brain (e.g., cerebellum,
basal ganglia, and supplementary motor, premotor and motor cortices) play a significant
role in cognition (Seitz, 2000a). For example, the acquisition in children of two-word
utterances during the second half of the second year of life is revealing. Roger Brown
(1973) has documented that eleven types of sensorimotor experience are commonly
manifested in infants’ initial two-word combinations (see also Gardner, 1982). For
instance, the relationship of agent performing an action is established during the
sensorimotor period and then later ‘‘mapped’’ onto early language (e.g., ‘‘Johnny fall’’).
These eleven fundamental types of bodily kinesthetic knowledge include forms of reference
(naming, recurrence, and nonexistence) as in the linguistic utterance, ‘‘There doggie;’’
various sets of relations (agent–action, agent–object, action–object, action–location, and
object–location) as in the utterance, ‘‘Book table;’’ possessor and possession (e.g., ‘‘My
ball’’); object attribution (e.g., ‘‘Little story’’); and the category of demonstrative entity in
which object specifications are applied to objects (e.g., ‘‘That ball’’). These abilities are
made possible because brain areas for motor and cognitive functions overlap and are
interdependent and in acquiring conceptual knowledge, the two are inextricably
intertwined (Seitz, 2000a). Thus, enactive or ‘‘action metaphors’’ (Dent, 1984) in which
a spinning top is likened to a dancing bear, emerge in early childhood presumably as a
consequence of the acquisition of sensorimotor knowledge acquired during infancy.
6.2. Mirror neurons
A second piece of evidence is that there is a ‘‘mirror system’’ for both action execution
and action recognition in the primate cortex suggesting the close association between
intended movements carried out by an actor and observed movement performed by some
viewer (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). This system is underwritten by ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in the
premotor cortex that link externally observed events (i.e., manual signs and gestures,
postural attitudes, facial expression, eye movements and gaze, vocal prosody, whole-body
movements, and rhythm) to internally generated motor actions and establishes a
coordinative relationship between gesture and intentional communication facilitating
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(Gallese & Goldman, 1998). This mirror system would enable primates to model external
events in self-initiated motor behaviors (i.e., mimetic skills; Donald, 1991) and such a
capacity would have enabled intentional (nonverbal) communication and eventually,
speech. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001a, b) argue that this mirror system would
underwrite ‘‘sensorimotor synesthesia’’ or the mimicking of auditory rhythm by rhythmic
movements. Forms of motor-to-motor mappings (‘‘synkinesia’’) would also be mediated
by mirror neurons and underlie enactive metaphor.
Moreover, this mirror system is generative. It has been credibly argued that there is a
general purpose sequencing module in the brain that parses (motor) action into its
components, recombines these components, and these recombined components underlie
both movement and speech (Corballis, 1999; Greenfield, 1991). Spoken language and
movement (e.g., gesture) would draw on the same underlying brain systems. Since, it is
assumed that gesture preceded speech in hominid evolution, it has been hypothesized that
the evolutionary basis for vocal languages originates in gesture (Corballis, 2002; Hewes,
1973). Contemporary studies of signed languages tend to bear this out. For instance, sign
language expresses metaphoric meaning through the modification of sign by way of the
overlapping, blending, and substitution of signed gestures (Klima & Bellugi, 1980;
Sternberg, 1999). Ironic and metaphoric modes of communication are quite common in
deaf communities including esthetic uses of sign as in deaf theater or sign poetry. Deaf
children, too, develop the capacity to produce figurative sign language through use of
pantomime, ritualized movement, sign modification, and by adding iconic, visuospatial
detail (Marschark, Everhart, Martin, & West, 1987). Similarly, research has shown that
blind subjects are able to depict motion metaphorically in drawings and will draw, for
example, curved spokes on paper to depict the movement of a wheel (Kennedy, 1997).
Indeed, both deaf and blind subjects—whether children or adults—make use of enactive
and perceptual metaphor in acquiring sign language, Braille or a spoken language (Winner
et al., 1979).
6.3. Cross-modal perception
In the third instance, there is evidence for cross-modal perception in infants and very
young children that arises from the close association between sensory, perceptual, and
cognitive processes that are intimately tied to the body (e.g., Asch & Nerlove, 1960; Spelke,
1981; Stern, 1985; Stern, Hofer, Haft, & Dore, 1985; Wagner et al., 1981). For instance, a
recent study demonstrated that 4-, 6-, and 8-month olds can discriminate visible, audible,
and bimodal components of isolated syllables (Lewkowicz, 2000). In this study, both
kinematic visual information and complex auditory information (e.g., vocal prosody)
enhanced infants’ responses to bimodal continuous utterances. Nonetheless, Lewkowicz
(1994) claims that while very young infants appear to match intersensory stimuli based on
equivalence of intensity, older infants and very young children match cross-modal stimuli
based on complete multisensory integration that includes the concatenation of sensory,
perceptual, and cognitive information. A similar view is proposed by Maurer (1997; Maurer
& Mondloch, 2005). She suggests that early cross-modal abilities are only apparent in early
infancy—so-called ‘‘neonatal synesthesia’’—based on cross-modal confusion and the lack of
cortical specialization. True cross-modal transfer appears to kick in before the end of the
first year or sooner and is based on connections among fully differentiated sensory areas.
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Finally, there is a evidence for a distributed neural network, including the
somatosensory cortex, limbic system, and cortical regions central to object- and self-
recognition, that form the neural basis for corporeal awareness, i.e., one’s representation
of one’s body or ‘‘body schema’’ (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997). One’s sense of self and
personal identity are constructed from one’s body, namely, body-centered representations
that are modulated over time by changes to one’s body schema or plan (Seitz, 2000b). It is
plausible that the ability to perceive and exploit early visual-affective and other sensory-
affective relations that rely on physiognomic characteristics—the outward appearance or
character of an individual—is a result of (a) the emergence of this distributed neural
network very early in development and, (b) evidence that this network forms the basis for
bodily awareness. To be sure, it has been suggested that in understanding others a cross-
modal representational system has evolved that binds self and other principally through
behavioral imitation. Such a cognate system appears to be innate and allows even very
young infants (e.g., 6-weeks old) to imitate others based on their own primitive body
scheme (Gopnik, 1993; Meltzoff & Moore, 2002).




Initial observations of the brain basis of basic metaphoric abilities (BmT) indicated that
intersensory correlations as well as physiognomic experiences derived from a primitive,
amodal core in which perceptual, affective, and motoric aspects of experience were
undifferentiated in early development (Werner, 1948, 1955, 1978; Werner & Kaplan, 1963/
1984). Werner termed these synesthetic associations ‘‘comparison metaphors.’’ More
recent studies have shown that these synesthetic associations are universal across languages
and cultures and presumably innate (e.g., Asch, 1955; Brown, 1958; Dey, 1996; Gerrig &
Banaji, 1994; Osgood, 1960).
With regard to the brain basis of language abilities, Geschwind (1964) contended
that language ability arose from cross-modal associations (i.e., the collation of vision,
audition, and somesthesis—bodily sensations—in the association cortices) between
nonlimbic modalities (e.g., visual–auditory, tactile–auditory) in the inferior posterior
parietal cortex (i.e., angular gyrus). He hypothesized that grammar was an intramodal,
i.e., auditory–auditory association. Although he argued that these cross-modal associ-
ation areas were not fully myelinated until the end of the fourth year of life, recent
evidence—reviewed below—suggests that these abilities emerge earlier in infancy.
7.2. Synesthesia
Marks and Bornstein (1987; Marks, 1996; Marks et al., 1987) allege that synesthetic
metaphors (e.g., brightness-loudness and brightness-pitch relationships) are based on
innate perceptual similarities whereas synesthetic metonymies (e.g., pitch-size and color-
temperature relationships) are learned figurative relations. They argue that synesthesia or
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infrastructure for (synesthetic) metaphorical mappings, as these putative innate perceptual
similarities are fixed and determinate as regards order, direction, and polarity. They
contend that they represent primitive perceptual forms that are created by means of
polysensory cortical neurons and integrated at cortical association areas. On the other
hand, metonymies are associative equivalences based on learned experience and are more
abstract and flexible; in extending them to nonsensory categories analogies are created.
Thus, synesthetic associations are argued to be one of the core abilities underlying more
advanced forms of metaphor and analogy.
The existence of heightened or ‘‘true’’ synesthesia in adults who experience unusually
strong cross-modal associations (e.g., colored hearing and gustation, shaped audition and
gustation, and textured and colored speech) is a relatively rare phenomenon, however
(Cytowic, 1993, 1995, 2002a, b; Cytowic & Wood, 1982a, b). Cytowic originally
hypothesized that the hippocampus might be the site of cross-modal integration as it
has been argued to be one of the major multimodal ‘‘convergence zones’’ in the cortex
(e.g., Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Fuster, 2003). There is no convincing evidence, however,
that the primary function of the hippocampus is to integrate sensory information across
disparate modalities. This may occur earlier in the processing stream extending from more
downstream unimodal sensory cortices to upstream multimodal convergence zones.
Several of the latter have been proposed for the major lobes of the cerebral cortex (Pandya
& Yeterian, 1990).
Cytowic also suggested that the anomalous cerebral dominance hypothesis proposed by
Norman Geschwind may underlie such heightened synesthetic experiences. The anomalous
dominance hypothesis asserts that hormonal influences on the developing brain (i.e.,
androgens) contribute to differences in the rate and extent of development of the right and
left cerebral hemispheres relative to each other (Devinsky & Schachter, 1997) and such a
situation may affect connections among relevant brain areas in synesthesia. Ramachan-
dran and Hubbard (2001a, b) and Cytowic (2002a, b), however, have more recently argued
that such heightened synesthesia may be an X-linked mutation causing excessive
propagation or faulty pruning of neural connections in early development. As a result,
there is abnormal cross-wiring between, for example, areas of color (V4) and number
(fusiform gyrus), between sound (auditory cortex) and motor areas (adjacent to Broca’s
area) or shape (inferior temporal), or between color (V4) and auditory maps in the superior
temporal gyrus. Heightened affective reactions experienced during such states may be due
to hyperactivation of limbic structures (e.g., amgydala, nucleus accumbens). Nonetheless,
the underlying brain basis and unconscious origins of synesthesia in normal adults and
children indicates the ubiquitousness of synesthetic associations in normal human
populations.
7.3. Multisensory and multimodal integration
Multisensory or multimodal integration is the ability to access a shared representation
through diverse sensory or brain pathways (Allen & Bekoff, 1997). Research on the brain
basis of multisensory integration indicates that the superior colliculus (SC), the anterior
ectosylvian cortex, and the rostral portion of the lateral suprasylvian sulcus—structures
located in the midbrain and frontal cortices—are comprised of multisensory neurons that
facilitate multisensory integration of visual, auditory, somatosensory, and motor
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2002; Stein, Stanford, Vaughan, and Wallace, 1999; Strehler, 1991). To be sure, it has been
demonstrated that in the primate cortex the integration of vision, touch, proprioception,
and motor feedback occurs in area 5 of the parietal cortex (i.e., intraparietal sulcus or IPS,
a midbrain structure) and underlies representation of the body plan (Graziano, Cooke, &
Taylor, 2000). It thus may provide the neural basis of physiognomic metaphor (BmT) along
with ventral visual areas of the cortex (V4 for facial perception) and the amygdala and
related limbic areas for the perception of emotion (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003).
Area V5 in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) appears to directly serve the detection of
biological motion (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000) and would seem to be a likely
candidate for the neural basis of enactive metaphor in BmT as well as auditory and
rhythmic synchronicity (the latter mediated by the right posterior superior temporal gyrus;
Liegeois-Chauvel, Peretz, Babai, Laguitton, & Chauvel, 1998) in the human perception of
music and cognate forms of cross-modal perception (Seitz, 2005). The STS appears to
function as a convergence zone for integration of the dorsal ‘where’ and the ventral ‘what’’
visual pathways as well as having important connections to the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for the interpretation of stimuli. The inferior temporal cortex
that houses memory for shape along with V4 (color) and V3 (dynamic form) in the
occipital cortex (Zeki, 1999) would be appear to be likely candidates for the neural basis of
perceptual metaphor in BmT.
The SC and an adjacent area in the cortex, the insula, appear to be implicated in the
amalgamation of crossmodal information based on temporal correspondence whereas the
inferior parietal sulcus (IPS) seems to be involved in the assemblage of cross-modal
information based on spatial correspondence, particularly in the anterior region of the IPS
or ‘‘AIP’’ (Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein, 2003). Both of these and related structures
would be probable candidates for synesthetic or cross-modal metaphor in BmT. To be sure,
the STS has been posited to coordinate audiovisual information in speech whereas the
insula and claustrum (CS), which are situated next to each other in the midbrain, appear to
integrate the visual and tactile modalities. The rhinal cortex in the medial temporal region
is proposed to be involved in the storage of multimodal representations, the claustrum in
their cortical synchronization, especially cortical synchronization of sensory-specific
cortices, and the SC playing a major role in the mediation of orienting and attentive
behaviors (Calvert, 2001).
Indeed, Calvert (2001) maintains that both cortical and subcortical structures are
involved in multisensory and multimodal integration at several heteromodal sites. The
cortical sites include the STS, the IPS, and areas in the frontal and parietal lobes. She
reasons that the frontal cortex is implicated in the initial learning of newly acquired
multimodal associations whereas the STS appears to be involved in the subsequent learning
of amodal representations. The IPS facilitates the multimodal integration of spatial
coordinate information, as described above, as well as the integration of vision and touch.
The subcortical sites include the supergeniculate and medial pulvinar nuclei of the
thalamus, which connect to the SC, and visual and auditory areas. On the other hand, the
nucleus reticularis thalami (NRT) is responsive to polymodal cortices. When inhibited by
these cortices it increases cortical arousal and potentiates the mesencephalic reticulating
system (MRF) enabling the organism to be more responsive to novel and biologically
significant stimuli—thus, enhancing the brain’s ability to pick out relevant percepts based
on these fundamental types of metaphoric processes described in BmT.
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primates and others species to increase the probability of stimulus detection—particularly
stimulus novelty and significance—heighten the ability of organisms to simultaneously
monitor multiple environmental cues, and facilitated both speed and accuracy of
identification as well as the ability to detect misinformation (Allen & Bekoff, 1997).
Creative thought in human primates, thus, would represent an exaptation or Darwinian
preadaptation of these multimodal abilities that originally evolved for the servicing of
more mundane activities essential to survival in other species. Ramachandran and
Hubbard (2001b, 2005) have made similar claims for the evolutionary role of the angular
gyrus in synesthetic metaphor. That is, the angular gyrus interleaves the spatial modalities
(audition, vision, and touch) creating the preconditions for abstract thought—extracting
correlated sensory information (e.g., sound, shape, and texture) to arrive at a more
complex percept or abstract property—for instance, ‘‘jaggedness.’’
Thus, the above cortical and subcortical structures would provide the biological
infrastructure for the integration of sensory, perceptual, affective, and motor information
found in perceptual, enactive, physiognomic, and synesthetic metaphors (BmT). We now
turn to some alternative views of early metaphor.
8. Alternative views of early metaphor
8.1. ‘‘Primary’’ metaphor
The foregoing description of four species of early metaphor and their emergence early in
development is by no means the only perspective on early metaphor. For instance, Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) allege that there are several hundred, universal metaphors that are
acquired early in development. For example, ‘‘IMPORTANT IS BIG’’ ‘‘DIFFICULTIES
ARE BURDENS,’’ and ‘‘LINEAR SCALES ARE PATHS.’’ These universal, conceptual,
and linguistic metaphors (‘‘primary’’ metaphor, Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) are acquired
early in development through a process of ‘‘conceptual mapping via neural connections’’
by means of ‘‘coactivation’’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 57). That is, in the process of
acquiring metaphoric relations, new conceptual mappings establish cellular changes in
neurons because of changes at synaptic junctures of neurons, according to Lakoff and
Johnson (1999). These changes are driven by what the child is exposed to in the
environment based on a process of coactivation or experiential similarity or co-occurrence
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
The difficulty with this view, however, is that it does not take into account the preliterate
(evolutionary basis), prelinguistic (i.e., early development in children prior to the
emergence of language), and extralinguistic (e.g., nonverbal, gestural) bases of metaphoric
activity prior to the development of speech and language or the fact that these ‘‘primary’’
metaphors or cognate childhood utterances are not found in the speech or language of
young children. Examples of the above ‘‘primary’’ metaphors would include, ‘‘Tomorrow
is a big day,’’ ‘‘She’s weighed down by responsibilities,’’ and ‘‘John’s intelligence goes way
beyond Bill’s,’’ respectively. In effect, these are actually later developing conceptual
metaphors. Such ‘‘secondary’’ metaphors as ‘‘UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING’’ as
in ‘‘I’ve never been able to grasp transfinite numbers’’ or ‘‘HAPPY IS UP’’ as in ‘‘I’m
feeling up today’’ are acquired conceptually later in development from—among other
things—similarity encountered in the environment (e.g., noting the similarity between
ARTICLE IN PRESS
J.A. Seitz / New Ideas in Psychology ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]16change and motion as in ‘‘My car has gone from bad to worse lately’’) or as a result of
encountering correlations between domains as a result of their co-occurrence (e.g.,
experiencing ‘‘organization’’ and ‘‘physical structure’’ together as in ‘‘How do the pieces of
this theory fit together?’’). These are learned conceptual relations and are built upon prior
category abilities and do not appear to index early metaphoric abilities that arise from
early sensory, perceptual, affective, and cognitive abilities found in BmT.
8.2. Other perspectives
Other perspectives on early metaphor suggest that early metaphor gives rise to highly
abstract metaphorical ‘‘blends’’ that abet creative discovery (i.e., ‘‘basic’’ metaphor,
Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002) or suggest that early metaphor works outside awareness
to structure our everyday folk conceptions (i.e., ‘‘implicit’’ metaphor, Vervaeke &
Kennedy, 1996) and may either cohere in a web of beliefs or result from experiential
similarity or co-occurrence. Grady (1998, 1999) and Grady, Taub, and Morgan (1996)
argue that complex metaphors are compound structures that are decomposable into
simpler submappings or ‘‘primitives’’ and suggest that they may arise from some
experiential basis or unspecified neurological structure.2 Of the former, they may originate
in correlations between dimensions, or components, of experience. Nonetheless, no
developmental evidence is provided to support these various notions of early metaphor. In
a small corpus of adult–child language samples, Johnson (1997) suggests that adult
language picks out the relevant dimensions for the child. Children’s use of metaphor,
however, emerges in domain-specific ways in development, is frequently spontaneous, and
is often not reflective of adult categories (Winner, 1988, 1995). For instance, pretend action
metaphors are the preponderance of metaphors in the third year, but by the fifth year
perceptual metaphors dominate (Winner, 1988). Certainly, adults do not regularly attend
to those features in their speech or actions such that children could acquire these abilities
from adult feedback alone. Thus, it is difficult to see how a learning model could
adequately account for the emergence of early metaphor.
8.3. The conflation view of early metaphor
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Johnson (1997), however, in several studies of the
language corpora of young children, maintain that children’s domains are ‘‘conflated’’ in
early development. That is, they suggest that early metaphor emerges in the second of two
stages. In the first or conflation stage, occurring ostensibly in infancy and through early
childhood, connections between domains are completely interleaved and are experienced
by the infant or child as one and the same. Under such a developmental scenario,
metaphoric associations are not possible. In the second or differentiation stage, occurring
in later childhood, metaphorical associations are established between a source (i.e., a
sensorimotor experience) and a target (i.e., a nonsensorimotor experience). Thus, on their
view, synesthetic and other kinds of metaphoric associations would not emerge until later
childhood. They suggest that the domains being conflated are sensorimotor experiences2Grady et al. (1996) and Grady (1998) address related problems with Lakoff and Johnson’s formulation of
complex metaphors as decomposable into primitives such as the notion of what counts as the experiential basis of
a metaphor.
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of cultural learning, neural connections develop between the domains such that there is a
differentiation of the source and target enabling the emergence of conceptual metaphor.
There is an abundance of experimental evidence, however, that indicates that even very
young infants are capable of perceiving perceptual, enactive, cross-modal, and other kinds
of metaphoric similarity (e.g., Maurer, 1997; Maurer & Mondloch, 2005; Meltzoff &
Borton, 1979; Lewkowicz, 1994, 2000; Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1983; Stern, 1985; Stern
et al., 1985: Wagner et al., 1981). Indeed, early metaphoric abilities in the perceptual
domains of color, shape, texture, and size; movement; and cross-sensory equivalence, are
established in late infancy and physiognomic perception by the middle of the third year, at
the latest. Innate factors play a significant, but not exclusive, role in the emergence of early
metaphor. Hence, the available scientific evidence does not support a notion of a
conflation stage in metaphoric development.8.4. Basic and conceptual metaphor emerge in two stages
An alternative position is that metaphoric creation and understanding emerge in a two-
stage process in which inborn metaphorical associations give rise to later developing
conceptual metaphor (Seitz, 1997). In the first stage, early metaphor is largely innately
based and reliant on underlying brain and bodily mechanisms (see Section 3.5). These early
or primary metaphoric associations would include the perceptual, enactive, cross-modal,
and physiognomic realms that, we have argued, unmistakably emerge early in development
(BmT). Lakoff, Grady, and colleagues suggest that such early metaphor does not exist
because ostensibly, (a) more time is needed in the infant or young child’s life for such
learning to occur (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), or (b) although more primitive metaphoric
structures may in fact exist, they do not adequately specify how they enter into any theory
of the development of more complex metaphor implicit in the SmT (Grady, Taub, &
Morgan, 1996).9. Conclusions
We believe that our BmT explains more about how people actually recognize or create
basic or primary metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience than does
that SmT partly because humans are ‘‘pre-wired’’ to make these linkages. These basic
metaphoric equivalences include perceptual–perceptual, movement–movement, cross-
modal (synesthetic), and perceptual-affective relations that we demonstrated are uniquely
mapped onto brain ‘‘networks.’’ We presented three major strands of scientific support for
this view: preliterate (i.e., evolutionary), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental), and extra-
linguistic (i.e., neuropsychological and cognitive) evidence. These basis metaphoric
relations generally operate outside of conscious awareness as compared to secondary or
conceptual metaphor, which, we propose, is typically an amalgam of both conscious and
unconscious processes.
SmT has typically ignored these linkages instead addressing problems with how people
process, recognize, produce or understand secondary or conceptual metaphor. We believe
our theory has the advantages of elegance and simplicity over the SmT in better explaining
the everyday and garden-variety metaphoric experiences of children and adults.
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